Переводы документов. Translations in English

NP-022-17. General safety assurance provisions for ships and other floating craft with nuclear reactors

NP-022-17

 

Approved by
Order of the Federal
Environmental, Industrial and
Nuclear Supervision Service dated
September, 4, 2017 No. 351

 

FEDERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
IN THE AREA OF ATOMIC ENERGY USE "GENERAL SAFETY
ASSURANCE PROVISIONS FOR SHIPS AND OTHER FLOATING CRAFT
WITH NUCLEAR REACTORS"

(NP-022-17)

 

I. Purpose and scope of application

 

1. These Federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use "General safety assurance provisions for ships and other floating craft with nuclear reactors" (NP-022-17) (hereinafter - the General Provisions) are developed in accordance with Article 6 of Federal Law dated November, 21, 1995 No. 170-FZ "On atomic energy use", Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated December, 1, 1997 N 1511 "On approval of Regulations on development and approval of federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use" (Collected Acts of the Russian Federation, 1997, No. 49, art. 5600; 2012, No. 51, art. 7203).

2. These General Provisions shall be applicable to ships and other floating craft with nuclear reactors, including floating power units, at all stages of their lifecycles.

3. The General Provisions establish the purposes, principles and the main criteria of safety for ships and other floating craft with nuclear reactors including floating power units (hereinafter - ships) as well as the basic principles and general requirements for technical and administrative safety assurance measures. The implementation scope of these principles and arrangements shall comply with the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use and standardization documents adopted in accordance with the standardization legislation of the Russian Federation. In the absence of necessary regulations the proposed specific technical solutions shall be justified in accordance with the state of the art in science, technology and production.

4. These General Provisions shall be applicable at the ship design, construction, operation and decommissioning stages established in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation in the area of atomic energy use.

5. The procedure for bringing the ships into compliance with these General Provisions, including time limits and scope of the required activities shall be determined in each particular case under the conditions of construction, operation or decommissioning license.

6. The list of abbreviations used in these General Provisions is presented in Appendix 1, terms and definitions - in Appendix 2.

 

II. The main purpose, criteria and principles of
safety assurance

 

7. The main purpose is to ensure the ship safety. Safety of the NPU and the NF storage facilities (in case they are located on the ship) shall constitute an integral part of the ship safety.

The ship shall be deemed to comply with the nuclear and radiation safety requirements provided that the following conditions are met:

radiation exposure for the ship crew and the special personnel, the public (passengers) and the environment under normal operation conditions and and in case of any operational occurrences up to design basis accidents inclusive does not exceed any established exposure limits for the ship crew, the special personnel and the public (passengers);

radiation exposure for the ship crew and the special personnel, the public (passengers) and the environment is limited in case of any beyond design basis accidents at the NPU;

the probability of any NPU accident occurrence on the ship is limited.

8. The ship safety shall be achieved through high-quality design, engineering and manufacturing of the equipment, construction and operation of the ship in accordance with the requirements of federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use, standardization documents adopted in compliance with the standardization legislation of the Russian Federation, safety culture formation and maintenance, consideration of the operation experience and the state of the art in science, technology and production.

9. The ship safety shall be assured through consistent implementation of the defense-in-depth principle based on the system of physical barriers in the way of ionizing radiation and radioactive substance propagation into the environment and the system of technical and administrative measures for protection of the barriers and maintenance of their efficiency.

The system of physical barriers on the ship shall include the fuel matrix, the fuel element cladding, the reactor coolant circuit boundary, the containment, the RP protective enclosure and biological protection.

The system of physical barriers in the SNF storage facility (in case it is provided in the ship design) shall include the fuel matrix, the fuel element cladding and the leak-tight physical barrier (defined and substantiated in the ship design based in the safe SNF storage technique and conditions) preventing any propagation of radioactive substances into the environment.

The system of technical and administrative arrangements shall include the measures aimed to ensure safety of the ship as well as the measures aimed to ensure safety of the ship crew, the special personnel and the passengers and also measures aimed to ensure safety of the public in the course of the ship stay at the basing locations and in ship repair and shipbuilding organizations.

The system of technical and administrative arrangements shall form five levels of defense-in-depth.

 

Level 1. Prevention of operational occurrences:

development of the ship design documentation based on the conservative approach with well-developed inherent self-protection of the RP and measures aimed to prevent the cliff edge effect;

assurance of the required quality for safety-related systems and components of the ship and any works performed in the area of atomic energy use;

operation of the ship in accordance with the requirements of the operation guidelines and manuals;

maintenance of the safety-related systems and components in good operable condition by timely detection of defects, implementation of preventive measures, control of their useful life, arrangement of the efficient maintenance and repair system and documenting of the work results;

selection and assurance of the required qualification level for the ship crew and the special personnel for performance of the works in the area of atomic energy use, actions under normal operation conditions and in case of any operational occurrences including emergency situations and accidents, safety culture formation;

base support arrangement for the ship operation.

 

Level 2. Prevention of design basis accidents by normal operation systems:

timely detection of any deviations from normal operation and their elimination;

control for the purpose of safety assurance in case of abnormal operation.

 

Level 3. Prevention of beyond design basis accidents by safety systems:

prevention of escalation of initiating events into design basis accidents and escalation of design basis accidents into beyond design basis accidents through the use of safety systems;

mitigation of consequences of any accidents that could not have been prevented by confinement of radioactive substances.

 

Level 4. Beyond design basis accident management:

return of the RP to the controlled state when the fission chain reaction stops, and continuous NF cooling and confinement of radioactive substances within the established boundaries are ensured;

prevention of any beyond design basis development and mitigation of their consequences, particularly through the use of special-purpose beyond design basis accident management equipment as well as any engineering features capable of performing the required functions under the existing conditions;

protection of the containment and (or) the protective enclosure against destruction in case of beyond design basis accidents and maintenance of their operability.

 

Level 5. Emergency planning:

preparation and implementation of the action plans for protection of the workers (personnel) in case of any accident on the ship, the action plans for protection of the public, assistance to the ship crew and (or) the special personnel with engagement of additional workforce and means.

The defense-in-depth shall be implemented at all stages of activities related to the NPU safety assurance to the extent covered by this type of activity. The strategy for prevention of unfavorable events shall be of top priority. Special attention shall be paid to Levels 1 and 2.

The ship design shall provide for the arrangements aimed to ensure independence of the defense-in-depth levels from each other.

10. In the course of normal operation all physical barriers shall be operable, and the system of technical and administrative measures for their protection shall be in the state of availability. If inoperability of any physical barrier provided in the design documentation capable of resulting in violation of safe operation limits or unavailability of any protective arrangements is detected the RP shall be shut down, and measures shall be taken to bring the RP into the safe state. The ship design shall incorporate measures aimed to prevent damage of any barriers resulting from damage of other barriers as well as damage of several physical barriers under a single impact.

11. Safe NPU operation limits and conditions shall be substantiated in the ship design, and the engineering features and administrative measures aimed to prevent any deviations from these limits and conditions shall be also provided.

12. Technical and organizational solutions adopted for the ship NPU safety assurance shall be tried in the previous experience, tests, studies and prototype operation practice. These requirements shall be applied in the design, construction and operation of the ship NPU, engineering and manufacturing, repair and refurbishment of its safety-related systems and components as well as in the course of the ship decommissioning.

13. The system of technical and administrative arrangements for the ship safety assurance, design basis for the safety-related systems and components shall be presented in the SAR. The SAR shall be developed by the main engineering organization designing the ship for each ship design with due regard for the NPU peculiarities. The SAR of the prototype ship shall be the standard SAR for any subsequent ships of this design. Any discrepancies between the information contained in the SAR and the ship design and affecting the NPU safety as well as deviations from the ship design in the course of its implementation shall not be permitted. Compliance of the SAR with the actual state of the ship shall be maintained by the operating organization within the entire ship service life.

14. Deterministic safety analysis and results of the probabilistic safety analysis shall be presented in the SAR. Safety analyses shall be performed for all operational states of the ship provided in the design with due regard for all locations of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and radioactive wastes on the ship where any operational occurrence can appear. Deterministic analyses of design basis accidents shall be based on the conservative approach. Any software means used for safety analysis shall be validated.

15. Arrangement and reliability of safety-related NPU systems and components, documentation and the performed works and rendered services in the area of atomic energy use affecting the ship safety shall be the subject of quality assurance activities at all stages of the complete ship lifecycle.

Quality assurance programs shall be developed in accordance with the requirements of federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

16. The ship design shall provide for the engineering features and administrative measures aimed to prevent any accidents at the NPU and to mitigate their consequences and ensuring:

non-exceedance of the limits for design basis NPU accidents established in the design through the use of inherent self-protection properties and application of safety systems;

mitigation of consequences of any beyond design basis NPU accidents due to application of special-purpose beyond design basis accident management equipment, use of any other engineering features capable of performing the required functions under the existing conditions and implementation of administrative measures including beyond design basis accident management arrangements.

17. The established limits for design basis NPU accidents shall not be exceeded in case of any initiating event considered in the ship design.

These initiating events in the ship design shall take into account coincidence of the initiating event with a failure of any of the following safety system components (independent from the initiating event): an active component or a passive component with mechanical moving parts, or any error of the crew or the special personnel independent from the initiating event.

In addition to a failure of any of the above-mentioned components independent from the initiating event all failures resulting from this single failure, failures resulting from the initiating event and also any failures of components undetectable in the course of the ship operation and affecting the NPU accident progression shall be taken into account.

The ship design shall establish the permissible period of any safety-related NPU system and (or) component disabling as well as the NPU power restriction level defined on the basis of reliability analysis or probabilistic safety analysis.

18. Ruptures of vessels manufactured and operated in accordance with the most stringent quality requirements stipulated by the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use and standardization documents adopted in compliance with the standardization legislation of the Russian Federation regulating their arrangement and operation shall be excluded from initiating events for design basis accidents.

It shall be substantiated in the ship design that the probability of the reactor pressure vessel breakage within a period of one year does not exceed 10-7.

19. The list of initiating events presented in the SAR shall include all possible internal and external events violating normal operation of the ship NPU and not eliminated by the inherent self-protection properties of the reactor and principles of its design. Combinations of the ship system and (or) component failures, errors of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel, internal or external impacts shall be included into the above-mentioned list of initiating events in the cases stipulated by the requirements of the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

20. Approximate lists of initiating events for analysis of design basis accidents for each NPU type are defined in the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use establishing requirements for the SAR. Final lists of initiating events for analysis of design basis accidents shall be presented in the SAR.

Internal events with the estimated occurrence probability of 10-6 or less within the period of one year may be excluded from the list of initiating events for analysis of design basis accidents presented in the SAR.

21. Approximate lists of beyond design basis accidents for each reactor type are defined in the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use establishing requirements for the SAR.

Final lists of beyond design basis accidents (including severe ones) shall be presented in the SAR. They shall include representative scenarios in order to define measures for management of such accidents. Representativeness of scenarios shall be provided by consideration of the ship state severity levels as well as potential operability or inoperability of safety systems and special-purpose engineering features for beyond design basis accident management.

Realistic (non-conservative) analysis of the above-mentioned beyond design basis accidents with assessment of development probabilities and consequences of beyond design basis accidents shall be given in the SAR.

Analysis of beyond design basis accidents presented in the SAR shall be used as the basis for development of action plans in order to protect the workers (personnel) and the public in case of any accidents and also for development of beyond design basis accident management guidelines.

22. The safety targets for the ship NPU include:

non-exceedance of the cumulative severe accident probability for each RP equal to 10-5 within the period of one year;

non-exceedance of the cumulative large-scale emergency release probability for each RP equal to 10-7 within the period of one year.

23. For beyond design basis accidents not eliminated by inherent self-protection properties of the reactor and the principles of its design (regardless of their probability) administrative measures for management of such beyond design basis accidents shall be developed including the measures aimed to reduce radiation exposure for the ship crew and the special personnel, the public and the environment.

24. Safety culture shall be formed and supported for all employees and organizations related to design, construction, operation and decommissioning of the ship, as well as development and manufacturing of safety-related systems and components.

Safety culture shall be formed and supported in the following way:

declaration of the ship safety priority over economic and production purposes;

selection, professional training and proficiency maintenance for the personnel in each safety-related area of activity;

strict adherence to discipline with clear distribution of authorities and personal responsibility for the workers;

development and strict adherence to the requirements of quality assurance programs, standard operating procedures and job descriptions (process regulations) and their regular updating with due regard for the experience gained;

managers at all levels shall create atmosphere of confidence and establish approaches to collective work as well as social and living conditions of the personnel forming inherent need for positive attitude toward safety;

each employee shall understand the impacts of his/her activities on safety and any potential consequences of failure to adhere or poor adherence to the requirements of the regulations, quality assurance programs, standard operating procedures and job descriptions;

self-control of safety-related activities by the employees;

each manager and employee shall understand inadmissibility of concealment of any errors in his/ her activities, the necessity for detection and elimination of their causes, the need for continuous self-improvement, study and implementation of the best practices particularly foreign ones;

establishment of the system of rewards and punishments based on the results of work activities that promotes transparency in the activities of the employees and prevents concealment of any errors in their work.

25. The operating organization shall ensure the ship safety including the arrangements aimed to prevent any accidents and mitigate their consequences, accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and radioactive wastes as well as radiological control.

The operating organization shall perform activities for the NPU safety enhancement in accordance with the plans developed with due regard for the results of safety analyses and operation experience in order to achieve the NPU safety targets specified in par. 22 of these General Provisions.

26.The operating organization shall provide selection and training of the ship crew and the special personnel, create the atmosphere where safety is considered as the affair of vital importance and the subject of personal responsibility for the ship crew and the special personnel and also exercise continuous control of the ship NPU safety.

27. The required organizational structure of management and the requirements for the proficiency level of the ship crew and the special personnel shall be substantiated in the ship design and presented in the SAR.

28. Construction of the ship may be commenced subject to availability of the ship design and the SAR approved in accordance with the established procedure and subsequent to obtaining of the license for works in the area of atomic energy use by the shipbuilding organization in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation in the area of atomic energy use.

29. The ship design shall provide for the technical and administrative arrangements aimed to ensure physical protection and fire safety on the ship.

30. The ship design shall provide for communication and annunciation means (particularly redundant ones) in order to arrange the NPU control under normal operation conditions and in case of any design basis and beyond design basis accidents.

 

III. Classification of the ship nuclear
power unit systems and components

 

31. The systems and components of the ship NPU are distinguished:

in terms of their purpose;

in terms of impact on safety.

32. The systems and components of the ship NPU are divided into the following groups according to their purpose:

normal operation systems and components;

safety systems and components;

systems and components of special-purpose hardware for beyond design basis accident management.

Safety systems and components are also distinguished by the nature of their safety functions.

33. The systems and components of the ship NPU are divided into the following groups according to their impact on safety:

safety-related systems and components;

other non-safety related systems and components.

Safety-related systems and components include:

safety systems and components;

normal operation systems and components if their failures result in exceedance of the basic dose limits, permissible ionizing radiation exposure doses, permissible RSb release or discharge limits or permissible radioactive contamination levels for the work rooms of the ship;

normal operation control and monitoring systems and components included into the control and protection system as well as other components of normal operation systems directly associated with the reactor if their single failure disturbs its normal operation or results in any failures of the systems intended for elimination of operational occurrences;

systems and components provided for accident management within the first three days after occurrence of the beyond design basis accident initiating event;

radiological control systems and components.

34. Safety systems and components are divided into the folloiwng groups according to the nature of their functions:

protective;

localizing;

supporting;

control.

35. Four safety classes are established in accordance with the safety impact of the NPU components.

Class 1. Class 1 includes fuel elements and NPU components in case their failures can become initiating events for accidents resulting in damage of fuel elements with exceedance of the maximum design limit expressed via the volumetric coolant activity while the safety systems perform their designed function.

Class 2. Class 2 includes the following NPU components not included into Class 1:

components whose failures constitute initiating events resulting in FE damage without the maximum design limit exceedance while the safety systems perform their design function, with due regard for the number of failures in these systems specified for design basis accidents;

safety system components whose single failures in case of a design basis accident result in exceedance of the design limits specified for such accidents.

Class 3. Class 3 includes safety-related NPU components not included into Classes 1 and 2.

Class 4. Class 4 includes non-safety-related normal operation NPU components not included into Classes 1, 2 and 3.

Components used to manage beyond design basis accidents and not included into safety classes 1, 2 and 3 shall also refer to safety class 4.

36. In case a component simultaneously has features of different safety classes this component shall be referred to a higher safety class.

37. Components separating any components of different safety classes shall be referred to a higher safety class.

38. Safety classes of the NPU components shall be assigned by the RP and ship designers in accordance with the requirements of these General Provisions.

The list of safety-related NPU systems with indication of the components referred to safety classes 1-3 shall be defined by the main engineering organization and presented in the ship design.

39. Requirements for quality of the NPU components referred to safety classes 1, 2 and 3 and assurance thereof shall be defined in the regulations and other regulatory documents establishing requirements for arrangement and operation of the NPU components. In this case the above-mentioned regulatory documents shall set more stringent requirements for quality and quality assurance of the components referred to higher safety classes.

40. Pertinence of the components to safety classes 1, 2 and 3, applicability of the regulations and other regulatory documents to these components shall be substantiated and specified in the documentation for design, development and manufacturing of the NPU systems and components and reflected in the SAR.

41. Classification designation reflects pertinence of the component to safety classes 1, 2, 3, 4. Classification designation shall be supplemented with the symbol reflecting the purpose of the component and (or) the nature of safety functions performed by this component:

N - normal operation component;

Z - protection component;

L - localizing component;

O - support component;

U - safety system control component;

T - component of special-purpose hardware for beyond design basis accident management.

If a component has multiple purposes all these purposes shall be included into the component designation.

Examples of classification designations:

2N, 3Z, 2NZ, 3T.

 

IV. Basic safety requirements implemented
in design of ship nuclear power units

 

General requirements

 

42. Safety-related systems and components shall be developed in accordance with the principles of these General Provisions and in compliance with any other federal  rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

43. The following design principles shall be applied in order to achieve the required reliability of safety systems:

single failure  principle - the principle stating that the system shall perform the assigned functions in case of any initiating event requiring its operation and a failure of any active component or passive components with moving mechanical parts independent from the initiating event;

priority principle - predominance of the safety function over all other control actions;

independence principle - the system reliability enhancement by functional and (or) physical separation of the channels (components) whereas a failure of any channel (component) does not result in  failure of another channel (component);

safe failure principle - enhancement of reliability in performance of the safety system functions by application of technical solutions providing the system transfer to the safe state in case of any system or component failure without any need for initiation of any actions via the CSS;

conservative approach principle - approach to the accident analysis when values and limits as well as conditions definitely leading to the most unfavorable results shall be assumed for the parameters and characteristics;

principle of approbation - the principle stating that technical and organizational solutions shall be field-proven by the previous experience or tests, studies and prototype operation practice and shall comply with the requirements of the regulatory documents;

function irreversibility principle - enhancement of the safety function performance due to follow-through of the commenced protective action up to the full completion of its implementation algorithm regardless of any changes in the initial conditions that have caused performance of this action;

diversity principle - enhancement of the system resistance to common cause failures by application (where possible) of various means and (or) similar means based on different operation principle in different systems (or in different channels within one system);

redundancy/ duplication principle - the principle for reliability enhancement by application of several similar or different components (channels, systems) so that each of them could perform the required function regardless of the state (including failure) of other components (channels, systems) intended to perform this function;

function controllability principle - monitoring of the system, channel, component availability for performance of the function and control of the function generation, performance and completion.

44. The ship NPU shall be designed in such a way so that to perform its functions under any conditions specified in the ship design in accordance with ship operation regions defined in the ship design.

45. Operation limits and conditions, safe operation limits and conditions for all operational states of the NPU including power operation of the reactor, shutdown states and refueling shall be established and substantiated in the ship design and reflected in the SAR.

46. The ship NPU shall have safety systems intended to perform the following basic safety functions:

emergency shutdown of the reactor and maintenance of its sub-critical state;

emergency heat removal from the reactor as well as from SNF storage facilities;

confinement of radioactive substances within the established limits;

sub-criticality assurance in the course of nuclear fuel storage.

Mutual impacts of safety systems preventing them from proper performance of their safety functions shall be eliminated. It is achieved inter alia by physical separation and functional independence.

47. The ship design shall provide for the engineering features to control the RP and NPU state under accident conditions (particularly in case of severe accidents) as well as post-accident monitoring means. The scope of the RP and NPU monitoring  stipulated in the ship design shall be sufficient for accident management.

48. Measures for protection of safety systems and components as well as special-purpose beyond design basis accident management hardware against common cause failures by implementation of diversity, redundancy and independence principles shall be considered and substantiated in the ship NPU design.

49. Preference in development of the NPU systems and components and in the RP design shall be given to the systems and components based on the passive principle of action and inherent self-protection properties (self-regulation, heat retention, natural circulation and other natural processes) and also on the safe failure principle.

50. The NPU design shall provide for the means to prevent any errors of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel or to mitigate their consequences particularly in the course of maintenance and repair.

51. Multi-purpose application of the safety systems and their components as well as combination of safety functions with normal operation functions shall not result in any violation of the NPU safety assurance requirements and deterioration of the safety function performance reliability.

52. Safety-related systems and components shall be subject to direct and complete verification for compliance with the design parameters in the course of commissioning, after refurbishment, repair and periodically throughout their entire service life. In case direct and (or) complete verification is impossible indirect and (or) partial testing shall be performed.

53. The NPU safety systems shall function in such a way so that their operation after actuation would continue up to complete performance of their functions. Return of the safety system into the initial state shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements established in the ship design and reflected in the operation documentation.

54. In case a safety-related system is arranged through the use of programmable digital devices the relevant standards, rules and methods for development, testing and verification of the programmable digital devices and software within the entire service life of the system and particularly in the course of software development shall be established and applied. All developments shall be subject to the quality assurance system. Means of protection against unauthorized interference into software functioning shall be provided.

55. Reliability analyses for performance of functions by safety-related systems as well as reliability parameters for safety-related components shall be presented in the SAR. Reliability analysis shall be carried out with due regard for common cause failures and errors of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel.

Reliability parameters of the safety-related systems and components shall be maintained in the course of operation.

56. The ship design shall specify requirements for chemistry regimes of the media in the NPU systems and components that should be observed in the course of operation in order to maintain integrity of physical barriers in the way of ionizing radiation and radioactive substance propagation into the environment.

 

Nuclear core design and characteristics

 

57. The nuclear core shall be designed in such a way so that to provide absence of any deformations in the nuclear core components disturbing normal functioning of reactivity control and emergency reactor shutdown means or preventing from cooling of fuel elements with exceedance of the established design fuel element damage limits under normal operation conditions and in case of any operational occurrences up to design basis accidents inclusive.

58. Characteristics of the nuclear fuel, design of the reactor and any other equipment of the primary circuit (including the coolant purification system) shall prevent formation of secondary critical amounts in case of severe accidents, particularly with fuel melting, with due regard for operation of any other systems.

59. The nuclear core, reactor, safety systems and components shall be designed in such a way so that to prevent the reactor pressure vessel melt-through in case of any operational occurrences.

60. Design of the reactor and the reactivity control devices shall prevent any unintended changes of reactivity under design inclinations (rotations), capsizing, vibration, shock impacts and any other dynamic loads considered in the ship design.

61. The reactivity control devices shall bring the ship RP into the sub-critical state from any power level within the time period defined in the ship RP design.

62. Systems ensuring residual heat removal from the nuclear core under normal operation conditions as well as in case of any emergency reactor shutdown, the nuclear core refueling and repair works shall be provided in the NPU. They shall function in the course of all design basis accidents and after them.

63. The ship design shall provide for the emergency core cooling system intended for make-up of any coolant losses and cooling of the nuclear core in case of a design basis accident.

 

Reactor coolant circuit

 

64. The reactor coolant circuit shall withstand static and dynamic loads and thermal impacts occurring at any section of the circuit (with due regard for operation of protective safety systems and their possible failures in accordance with par. 17 of these General Provisions) without any breakage in case of any operational occurrences up to design basis accidents inclusive particularly accidental energy releases into the coolant caused by:

sudden insertion of positive reactivity in case of the most efficient reactivity control device ejection with the maximum velocity in case such ejection is not prevented by the design;

injection of the "cold" coolant into the nuclear core (with negative reactivity coefficient with regard to the coolant temperature) or any other possible positive reactivity effect related to the coolant.

65. The "leak before break" concept shall be applied for the reactor coolant circuit in the RP design. Engineering features and administrative measures for timely detection of any through cracks in the reactor coolant circuit pipelines and the RP bringing to the safe state before the crack reaches critical size shall be provided.

In case of any deviation from the above-mentioned requirement substantiation shall be presented in the RP design.

66. Layout of reactor coolant circuit shall ensure conditions for development of natural coolant circulation in the circuit in case of any loss or absence of forced circulation, particularly during design basis accidents.

67. The systems for purification of the reactor coolant from any radioactive contaminants shall be designed to operate up to the safe operation limit for FE damage in order to ensure the NPU operation with the reasonably achievable low level of the reactor coolant circuit activity.

68. The following shall be provided in the NPU for the reactor coolant circuit:

arrangements to prevent hydrogen accumulation in explosive concentrations;

arrangements to prevent ingress of foreign objects;

means for monitoring of neutron poison nuclides content in the coolant as well as in any media supplied to the reactor coolant circuit;

hardware for the coolant activity monitoring;

hardware for monitoring of the coolant level in the reactor or the pressurizers;

engineering features to limit coolant leakage flows from the circuit;

measures to eliminate adverse impact of the circuit heat insulation on operability of the safety systems.

 

Process control

 

General requirements

 

69. Control of the NPU processes shall be arranged through the use of the IHCS including the required systems (sub-systems) that solve the tasks for control of the functional RP components and the associated systems and components and the control system for individual equipment.

The IHCS shall consist of normal operation systems and CSSs.

70. The IHCS shall provide control in all NPU operation modes with the quality and reliability parameters and metrological characteristics established in the ship design.

In case of the NPU blackout (disconnection from the normal power supply sources) the systems (sub-systems) solving the tasks for control of the functional RP components and the associated systems and components shall ensure fulfillment of the following requirements:

automatic insertion of the reactivity control devices into the nuclear core in the lowest position provided in the RP design;

automatic activation of the emergency RP cooldown systems;

functioning of the control and monitoring means for the RP systems and components and the associated systems and components ensuring safe bringing of the RP into the sub-critical state from the emergency power supply sources.

71. The CCR and the ECS shall be provided for control of the RP and the associated systems and (or) components under normal operation conditions and in case of any operational occurrences including design basis accidents. Control from the ECS shall be carried out during any operational occurrences in case of impossibility to arrange control from the CCR.

 

Central control room

 

72. Adequacy of the arrangements aimed to ensure functioning of the NPU CCR in all ship operation modes including accidents shall be substantiated in the ship design.

The CCR shall be protected against unauthorized access.

73. Parameters controlled in the CCR shall ensure in-process presentation of the information on actual state of the RP and the associated systems and components in compliance with the safe operation limits and conditions and also on identification of automatic activation and functioning of the safety systems and components to the ship crew and (or) the special personnel.

Arrangements shall be provided to prevent any common cause failure of the CCR and the ECS.

74. The following shall be provided in the NPU CCR:

means for control and monitoring of the NF fission chain reaction in the nuclear core;

control and monitoring means for the RP systems and (or) components and the associated systems and components;

end position alarm and (or) position indicators for the reactivity control devices;

the system for in-process presentation of the information on the state of the RP systems, components and equipment and the associated systems and components to the ship crew and (or) the special personnel;

control and monitoring means for the SNF cooling systems and components of the NF storage facility at the FPU;

self-sustaining fission chain reaction alarm means for the NF storage facility at the FPU;

the system of information support for the ship crew and (or) the special personnel.

Information on the state of the RP systems and components and the associated systems and components, the NF storage facilities at the FPU shall ensure reliable assessment of their safe operation limits and conditions.

75. Commands for remote control of the hardware generated by the control systems in automatic (automated) control mode or through the use of the remote control switches on the CCR panels shall be registered automatically. The list of signals subject to registration shall be substantiated in the ship design and presented in the SAR.

76. In case of total NPU blackout reliable communication between the NPU CCR and other control stations shall be ensured.

 

Emergency cooldown station

 

77. The ECS shall be provided in case of the CCR inoperability.

78. The ECS shall ensure performance of the control functions for switching of the RP and the associated systems and components into the safe state. Arrangements for the ECS protection against ionizing radiation, fires, explosions and missiles in case of any accidents shall be provided.

79. The ECS shall be protected against unauthorized access.

 

Normal operation control systems

 

80. The normal operation control systems shall ensure:

the NPU control in all operation modes;

automatic and (or) automated diagnostics of the NPU state and operation modes;

detection of any deviations from the safe operation limits and conditions established in the NPU design and warning alarm for these deviations;

detection of any reactor coolant circuit leakage (with the measurement error defined in the system design) and its location;

automated monitoring of the reactor circuit coolant radioactivity;

redundancy of the alarm, data exchange and control channels;

presentation and registration of the information on the process parameters characterizing the NPU operation;

information support for the operator, particularly for the purpose of accident management;

communication between the ship crew and (or) the special personnel in the CCR or ECS,  the ship crew and (or) the special personnel at local control stations and the ship crew and (or) the special personnel or workers performing any works directly on the ship NPU equipment.

The list of the controlled process parameters during operation of the RP and the associated systems and components shall be substantiated in its basic design and presented in the SAR.

81. The ship design with regard to the NPU NOCS shall contain the following analyses: response of the RP and NPU control and monitoring systems to any potential failures in the systems;

reliability of functioning of the hardware, software and the entire system;

stability of the control and automatic adjustment systems;

technical solutions preventing any unauthorized positive reactivity insertion and blocking of the emergency protection signals not provided in the basic design of the system;

operability and (or) operability maintenance period for the control system under extreme conditions (fire, flooding, the ship capsizing, pressure increase in the room).

82. The ship design with regard to the NPU NOCS shall provide for the means to monitor the neutron flux change rate and density in all operation modes and conditions, particularly in the sub-critical mode in the course of the reactor start-up and the NF refueling. Additional (removable) neutron flux density monitoring means may be used in the course of the first NF loading or refueling of the RP nuclear core; these means shall be substantiated in the ship design and specified in the SAR.

 

Information support system for the operator Independent
information recording and storage means

 

83. The information support system for the operator shall provide consolidated information on the NPU parameters characterizing the state of safety functions to the ship crew and (or) the special personnel.

84. The ship design shall provide for the independent means ensuring registration, storage, display and transmission of information required to investigate the NPU accidents. The above-mentioned means shall be protected from unauthorized access and shall retain their operability in case of any anticipated operational occurrences including design basis and beyond design basis accidents. The scope of the recorded and stored information shall be substantiated in the ship design and specified in the SAR.

 

Safety systems

 

Control safety systems

 

85. The NPU CSSs shall be provided in the ship design.

86. The CSSs shall perform their functions automatically upon occurrence of the conditions specified in the ship design. The necessity for any forced change of the automatic CSS operation from the CCR in the course of the emergency protection algorithm implementation shall be substantiated and specified in the SAR. It should be demonstrated in the basic designs of the RP and any systems (sub-systems) solving the tasks for control of the functional NPU components and the associated systems and (or) components that the NPU remains in the safe state in all cases considered in the design without any operator's interference within the specified time.

87. The CSSs shall be designed in such a way so that to follow any commenced action through up to full completion of the function in accordance with the preset algorithm for the RP bringing into the safe state.

CSSs shall be separated from normal operation control systems to the extent providing that any disturbance or disabling of any component or channel of the normal operation control systems would not affect the CSS capability to perform its functions.

Any failure of CSS components for automatic control of safety system components shall not impair their control by the operator.

88. The ship design shall provide for the possibility of both remote and manual activation of the NPU safety systems. Any failure in the automatic actuation circuit shall not prevent remote actuation and performance of safety functions. Impact on the minimal number of control elements shall be sufficient for remote and manual actuation.

Any failure of the automatic controls shall not impair remote or manual activation of the safety systems.

89. The CSS arrangement shall minimize the possibility of spurious actuations.

90. The following shall be provided in the CSS:

continuous automatic diagnostics of operability for the control systems;

periodic diagnostics of operability for the CSS channels and diagnostics of the process equipment.

Hardware and software failures and CSS damages shall result in generation of alarms in the CCR and at the local control stations and initiate the actions aimed to ensure the NPU safety.

The ship design with regard to the NPU CSS shall contain the analyses within the scope similar to the requirements stated in par. 81 of these General Provisions.

 

Protective safety systems

 

91. The ship design shall provide for protective safety systems aimed to assure reliable emergency shutdown of the reactor and its maintenance in the sub-critical state under normal operation conditions and in case of any operational occurrences including design basis accidents.

92. Efficiency and fast response of the reactor trip systems shall be sufficient to limit energy releases to the level preventing any damages of the fuel elements or the reactor coolant circuit systems and components in excess of the established design limits and to compensate positive reactivity caused by any reactivity effect or any possible combination of reactivity effects under normal operation and in case of design basis accidents.

93. Emergency shutdown of the reactor shall be provided regardless of availability and state of the power supply sources.

94. The protective safety systems shall include the systems for emergency heat removal from the reactor to the ultimate heat sink consisting of several independent channels.

95. Measures to prevent the reactor transition to the critical state and exceedance of the permissible pressure in the reactor primary circuit system during actuation and operation of the emergency system of heat removal from the reactor shall be provided.

96. Actuation of the protective safety systems shall not result in any failures of the normal operation systems and (or) components. The permissible number of actuations for the protective safety systems (including spurious actuations) within the service life of the ship NPU shall be substantiated in the design on the basis of their impact on the remaining life of the NPU systems and mechanisms.

 

Localizing safety systems

 

97. Localizing safety systems shall be provided for confinement of radioactive substances and ionizing radiation within the boundaries specified in the ship design in case of any accident.

98. Localizing safety systems shall be provided for each RP and shall perform the assigned functions in case of design basis accidents as well as beyond design basis accidents considered in accordance with par. 21 of these General Provisions. Combined usage of individual components of the localizing safety systems in general for several RPs is permitted provided that prevention of any impact of accidents at one NPU on the other NPU is substantiated in the ship design.

99. The ship RP shall have a double localizing system - the containment and the protective enclosure. The protective enclosure may be combined with the hull structures of the ship.

100. The containment shall be designed for the internal pressure caused by emergency coolant release from the reactor circuit in case of any instant rupture of its pipeline with due regard for the operation of the containment pressure reduction system and shall maintain its functions in case of the ship drowning.

Testing of the containment in the course of commissioning shall be performed under the design pressure. Subsequent testing shall be carried out under the pressure substantiated in the ship design. Any hardware located inside the containment rooms shall withstand testing without any loss of operability. The method and hardware aimed to test the containment for compliance with the design parameters shall be provided in the ship design.

101. All components of the containment leak-tight circuit where any release of radioactive substances beyond the boundaries of leak-tight rooms is possible in case of accidents shall be equipped with shut-off valves or sealing devices.

102. Permissible levels of ionizing radiation behind the biological protection and the acceptable degree of leak-tightness loss for the containment ensuring non-exceedance of the basic exposure dose limits for the ship crew and the special personnel and the norms of radioactive substance releases into the environment under normal operation conditions and in case of any operational occurrences including design basis accidents shall be substantiated in the ship design.

Compliance of actual leak-tightness with the design one shall be confirmed prior to  physical start-up of the reactor and checked in the course of operation with the frequency specified in the ship design.

103. Measures for detection and prevention of explosive hydrogen concentration generation in the RP rooms shall be provided.

 

Supporting safety systems

 

104. The ship design shall provide for the necessary supporting safety systems performing the functions of the working medium and power supply to the safety systems and arrangement of the required conditions for their functioning including heat transfer to the ultimate heat sink. The supporting safety systems also include the fire extinguishing systems that ensure the required conditions for functioning of the safety systems in case of a fire breakout.

105. The NPU supporting safety systems shall have reliability parameters for performance of the assigned functions sufficient to achieve the required functional reliability of the safety systems as stipulated in the ship design in combination with reliability parameters of the safety systems supported by them.

106. Performance of the functions described in par. 104 of these General Provisions by the supporting safety systems shall have priority over the internal protections of the supporting safety system components provided that it does not result in more severe consequences for the ship safety.

The list of non-disableable protections of the supporting safety system components shall be substantiated in the ship design and presented in the SAR.

107. Power supply of the NPU safety systems shall be arranged from the main, backup and emergency power supply systems of the ship. The backup and emergency power supply systems shall be independent from the operation of the NPU and the associated systems and (or) components.

The backup and emergency power supply systems in general shall ensure power supply for the systems required for the RP shutdown and maintenance in the safe state  within the period of time specified in the ship design with due regard for the possibility of fuel delivery for the power sources of the backup and emergency power supply systems or arrangement of power supply from any external source, and for self-propelled ships the possibility for the ship movement within the limits and conditions established in the ship design and substantiated in the SAR shall be additionally provided.

108. In presence of single-type backup and emergency power supply sources not providing continuous power supply with due regard for the single failure principle the intermediate independent power supply source shall be arranged in order to ensure uninterrupted functioning of the hardware required for the RP start-up or shutdown and cooldown within the period necessary to activate backup or emergency power supply sources.

The time required to activate backup or emergency power supply sources shall be substantiated in the ship design and specified in the SAR.

109. In case several RPs are installed on the ship the power supply systems shall be designed and calculated with due regard for the possibility to arrange backup and emergency power supply for each RP.

The possibility to activate backup and emergency RP power supply from the CCR, the ECS and the local control station shall be provided.

 

Requirements for collision protection and location of the
reactor plant and the associated
systems and components on the ship

 

110. Location of the RP and the associated systems and (or) components on the ship shall be substantiated in the ship design with due regard for the RP peculiarities; in this case safety of the ship crew and the special personnel, access to the equipment in the course of maintenance and repair shall be provided.

111. The reactor compartment, the adjacent compartments or their parts shall be equipped with collision protection intended to protect the RP and safety-related systems against any damage under external impacts of natural and human-induced origin considered in the ship design.

112. Location of the mechanisms, equipment, IHCS hardware important for safety of the RP and the associated systems and components shall ensure their protection against internal (from the ship) and external impacts considered in the ship design.

113. Connections between the ship service systems and any systems containing or capable to contain radioactive substances as per the ship design shall be equipped with double shut-off valves.

Safety of these connections shall be substantiated in the ship design and specified in the SAR.

 

Requirements for the nuclear fuel
and radioactive waste handling systems of the floating power unit

 

114. The NF handling systems shall ensure safety in the course of its storage and any handling and transportation operations.

115. Safety in the course of NF handling shall be substantiated in the ship design. The lists of potential operational occurrences, initiating events of design basis and beyond design basis accidents as well as safety analysis shall be presented in the SAR with regard to NF handling.

Systems for heat removal to the ultimate heat sink shall be provided in the SNF storage facilities in order to prevent any damage of the nuclear fuel and ingress of radioactive substances into the ship rooms or the environment.

The ship design shall provide for the equipment aimed to perform any NF handling and transportation operations including SNF removal from the FPU.

Safety analysis for the NF storage facilities under normal operation conditions and in case of any operational occurrences including accidents shall be performed.

116. Any possibility for achievement of criticality in the course of NF storage and performance of handling and transportation operation shall be eliminated by assurance of the relevant characteristics of the repositories and equipment intended to perform the handling and transportation operations.

117. The permissible period of NF storage on the ship shall be substantiated in its design and specified in the SAR.

118. SNF shall be transferred from the ship only to the dedicated facilities for SNF handling.

119. The operating organization shall provide safe handling of radioactive wastes including their storage within the established time limits for interim RW storage.

120. Radioactive wastes on the ship shall be collected and stored in special-purpose tanks and containers located in the controlled access area. RW shall be transferred from the ship only to the dedicated facilities for RW handling.

121. The ship design shall contain analysis of the composition and quantity of solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive wastes under normal ship operation conditions as well as assessment of the composition and quantity of radioactive wastes in case of design basis accidents performed in order to plan technical and administrative measures for RW handling within the post-accident period.

RW handling means providing for collection, segregation, processing, conditioning and storage of radioactive wastes under normal operation of the ship and in case of any operational occurrences up to design basis accidents inclusive shall be arranged.

 

V. Safety assurance in the course of ship construction

 

122. The main engineering organization and the shipbuilding organization shall be responsible for the ship safety assurance in the course of its construction and commissioning, and the operating organization shall bear this responsibility after the ship acceptance.

123. Installation of the ship NPU systems and components shall be arranged in accordance with the requirements of the detailed design documentation.

Quality control and acceptance of the performed works and rendered services shall be arranged in accordance with the requirements of the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use, standardization documents adopted in compliance with the standardization legislation of the Russian Federation and the detailed design documentation.

124. Results of the installation and adjustment works, physical start-up of the reactor, the entire NPU testing shall confirm that the NPU and safety-related systems and components are arranged and function in accordance with the design, and all detected defects are eliminated. Testing of the NPU shall be carried out in accordance with the programs and methods developed by the main engineering organization.

125. Actual characteristics of the safety-related systems and components shall be determined and documented in the course of the ship NPU testing.

The list of characteristics to be documented shall be defined in accordance with the relevant testing programs.

126.The NF loading into the reactor, physical start-up of the reactor, integrated testing of the NPU shall be carried out in accordance with the conditions for proceeding from one stage of the works to another established by the requirements of the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

 

VI. Safety assurance in the course of ship operation

 

General provisions

 

127. The RP and the SNF storage facilities shall be under surveillance of the ship crew and the special personnel on the watch within the entire period of NF stay on the ship.

128. All NF reloading and RW removal works on the ship or any other works with the possibility for radioactive contamination propagation shall be performed only in duly located and equipped areas. Exposure of the ship crew and the special personnel in the course of these works shall be monitored.

129. The possibility for urgent switching of the RP to the design power level shall be provided on the ship under normal operation conditions.

The number of urgent start-ups and shutdowns of the RP shall be substantiated in the RP design and specified in the SAR.

 

Arrangement of operation

 

130. The operating organization shall arrange the required organizational units  for safe operation of the ship, provide them with the necessary authorities, financial, material and technical resources, operation and regulatory documentation, scientific and technical support, arrange physical protection and fire protection of the ship, ensure selection, training and retraining of the ship crew and the special personnel, create the atmosphere where safety is considered as the subject of personal responsibility for the ship crew and the special personnel and also carry out continuous monitoring of the NPU safety.

131. The NPU operation shall be arranged in accordance with the NPU operation guidelines developed by the main engineering organization with participation of the IHCS and RP designers and designers of individual systems and components.

132. The NPU operation guidelines shall contain the rules and basic techniques for safe operation as well as the safe operation limits and conditions for the NPU equipment.

133. The size of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel required to ensure safe operation of the NPU shall be substantiated in the ship design. Any changes in the staff size of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel in the course of operation shall be agreed with the main engineering organization and approved by the operating organization for each ship (or ship design) depending on its purpose and peculiarities.

134. The operating organization shall arrange development and issuance of the guidelines defining the actions of the ship crew and the special personnel in case of any design basis accidents, beyond design basis accident management guidelines based on the SAR and the NPU operation manual.

The actions of the ship crew and the special personnel prescribed by the instructions and guidelines in case of beyond design basis accidents shall be based on the characteristics of events, the NPU state and prediction of the conditions expected in the course of accident development.

The NPU operation manual shall contain the lists of potentially hazardous works and technical requirements for their performance.

135. Maintenance, repair, testing and inspections shall be provided in order to maintain operability of the NPU safety systems and components and to prevent any failures of safety-related systems and components. Performance of the above-mentioned works shall be documented. The safe operation conditions specified in the operation guideline (process regulations) shall be observed in case of shutdown of safety systems and (or) components for maintenance and repair as well as in the course of testing and inspections. Measures shall be provided to eliminate any possibility of unauthorized changes in the circuits, equipment and algorithms of the control safety systems. Subsequent to maintenance safety systems and their components shall be checked for operability and compliance with the design characteristics, and the results of such checks shall be documented.

136. The operating organization shall establish and adhere to the procedure for maintenance, storage and review of the operation documentation.

The ship design, as-build documentation for the NPU manufacturing, test reports and as-build documentation for maintenance and repair of safety systems and components and safety-related components referred to safety classes 1 and 2 shall be stored within the entire NPU operation period.

137. The operating organization shall ensure documenting of any information on monitoring of the safe NPU operation limits and conditions and storage of these documents within the entire ship operation period. Materials on investigation of any NPU operational occurrences shall be stored by the operating organization within the entire ship operation period.

138. Start-up of the RP in case of any malfunctions of the safety-related NPU systems and (or) components is prohibited. In case of any impossibility to comply with the safe operation limits and conditions the RP shall be shut down.

139. In case of the ship operation in extreme situations associated with the risk of wreckage the NPU shall be operated with implementation of all technical and administrative arrangements required to rescue the ship crew, the special personnel and the public (passengers).

The decision on further operation of the RP in such situations shall be made in accordance with the official duties taking into account the ship state and potential radiation hazard for the workers, the public and the environment in compliance with the requirements of the operation documentation and guidelines on the usage of equipment in case of accidents. In case the ship wreckage is inevitable the arrangements aimed to bring the RP into the safe state shall be implemented in advance.

140. Any operational occurrences at the NPU including accidents shall be investigated in accordance with the federal  rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use. The operating organization shall develop and implement measures to prevent any repeated occurrences due to the causes that have previously resulted in operational occurrences at the NPU.

141. The operating organization shall submit information on any operational occurrences at the NPU to the competent state regulatory authority for safety in atomic energy use and the authorized atomic energy usage controlling agency. Unimpaired access for any representatives of the competent state regulatory authority for safety in atomic energy use to the operation documentation containing the data on the above-mentioned occurrences shall be provided in accordance with the effective legislation.

The operating organization shall provide for storage of the materials on investigation of any operational occurrences at the NPU within the entire service life of the ship.

142. The operating organization shall develop annual reports on assessment of the current NPU safety state containing the results of the NPU safety assurance surveillance performed by the operating organization and the NPU safety analysis based on the safety parameters within the reporting operation period including consolidated analysis of any operational occurrences at the NPU.

Recommendations on the report structure and content shall be established in the relevant safety guidelines in the area of atomic energy use.

143. In the course of the ship operation the operating organization shall arrange collection, processing, analysis, systematization and storage of information on any failures of the safety-related NPU systems and components, erroneous actions of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel as well as submittal of this information to all concerned parties in accordance with the procedure established as per the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

144. In order to extend the ship NPU service life in excess of the operating lifetime specified in the ship design the operating organization shall substantiate the possibility to extend the assigned NPU service life in accordance with the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

 

Selection and training of the ship crew
and the special personnel

 

145. The ship crew and the special personnel admitted to unsupervised works on the relevant positions shall be present at the workplaces in the course of the NPU operation; the minimum requirements for the size and composition of the ship crew and the special personnel shall be defined in the ship design and specified in the SAR.

146. Certain activities in the area of atomic energy use shall be performed by the ship crew and the special ship personnel subject to availability of permits for performance of works in the area of atomic energy use issued by the competent state authority for safety regulation in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

147. The list of specialists from among the ship crew or the special personnel subject to obtaining the permits for performance of works in the area of atomic energy use depending of their activities shall be defined by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Qualification requirements for the ship crew and the special personnel not subject to obtaining of any permits from the competent state authority for safety regulation in the area of atomic energy use shall be defined by the operating organization.

148. in case of any refurbishment of the NPU systems and (or) components the operating organization shall ensure timely introduction of the necessary changes into the operation documentation as well as familiarization of the relevant ship crew and (or) special personnel members with the introduced changes and arrangement of training and drilling in case of necessity.

149. The operating organization shall develop methods and programs for emergency response drills in order to exercise the actions under accident conditions and organize the above-mentioned drills.

150. The ship crew and the special personnel of the ship shall be prepared for actions in case of any design basis and beyond design basis accidents.

151. Emergency response drills shall be held  in order to prepare the ship crew and the special personnel for actions under accident conditions.

152. Equipment (including various types of simulators) prescribed for training of the ship workers shall be used in professional training of the ship crew and the special personnel in order to exercise practical NPU operation skills. Special attention shall be paid to drilling of the actions in case of any potential operational occurrences at the NPU (including accidents) and consideration of the operation experience.

153. The ship crew and the special personnel shall be subject to medical examination before admittance to unsupervised work.

 

Requirements for arrangement of operation

 

154. The main engineering organization shall define the configuration of the buildings (facilities), process equipment, transportation means and utilities required to support the ship operation (hereinafter - the infrastructure) in the ship design; the safe ship operation limits and conditions under external impacts of natural and human-induced origin shall be also determined.

155. The infrastructure required to support the ship operation shall ensure:

maintenance and repair of the NPU (within the scope defined in the ship design) and the associated systems and components;

supply of working media, materials, spare parts and the required energy types;

the RP nuclear core refueling;

storage of fresh fuel and SNF (in case it is provided in the ship design);

RW management (in case it is provided in the ship design);

SNF handover for processing or disposal.

156. The infrastructure required to support the ship operation shall consist of:

berths;

airlocks and sanitary barriers;

stations of radiological control and the ambient media sampling;

decontamination areas for the process equipment and tools;

fresh fuel and SNF storage facilities (in case it is provided in the ship design);

areas for temporary storage of solid RW and tanks for temporary storage of liquid RW (in case it is provided in the ship design);

access ways and hoisting equipment for SNF and RW removal.

157. Requirements for the infrastructure necessary to support the operation of the floating power unit NPU shall be substantiated in the design and specified in the SAR.

158. The operating organization shall provide for:

accounting of exposure doses for the ship crew and the special personnel engaged in the NPU maintenance and repair and any other operations with radioactive substances and nuclear materials;

development and implementation of the measures aimed to reduce exposure doses for the ship crew and the special personnel below the established limits and to the lowest reasonably achievable level;

administrative and technical measures for safety assurance in the course of NF and RW storage.

 

Safety assurance in the course of the
ship reactor plant nuclear core refueling

 

159. Design of the ship providing the RP nuclear core refueling on the ship through the use of the internal NF handling system shall substantiate safe handling of the nuclear fuel in the course of all operations within the RP nuclear core refueling process cycle on the ship. Safety in the course of NF handling shall be substantiated in the SAR.

160. In case of necessity to perform the RP nuclear core refueling through the use of any equipment not included into the ship NF handling system the basic design of the RP nuclear core refueling with the use of this equipment shall be developed.

161. Design basis accidents in the course of the RP nuclear core refueling process cycle on the ship shall be considered in the ship design and (or) the basic design of the RP nuclear core refueling.

162. Equipment used in the RP nuclear core refueling process cycle shall be tested in accordance with the requirements for the NF handling systems.

163. Drilling shall be arranged prior to commencement of the RP nuclear core refueling process cycle on the ship in order to exercise the actions of the ship crew and the special personnel in case of any emergency situations and accidents.

164. The following shall be ensured within the entire RP nuclear core refueling cycle:

sub-criticality of the nuclear core;

residual heat removal;

monitoring of the radiation situation on the ship;

control of the exposure doses for the ship crew and the special personnel engaged in the RP nuclear core refueling;

compliance with the process regulations for the RP nuclear core refueling;

accounting and control of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and radioactive wastes;

physical security on the ship.

 

Action plans for protection of the workers (personnel)
and the public in case of any accident on the ship and accident management

 

165. Action plans for protection of the workers (personnel) in case of any accident on the ship shall be developed and ready for implementation in the course of the ship usage in accordance with the design purpose as well as the ship stay at the permanent and temporary basing locations and the allowed ports including ship repair and shipbuilding organizations (prior to commencement of the RP nuclear core loading).

166. The contents of the above-mentioned action plans shall comply with the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

167. The ship crew and the special personnel of the ship, the workers of ship repair and shipbuilding organizations shall be prepared for actions in case of any design basis and beyond design basis accidents. Actions in case of beyond design basis accidents shall be regulated by special-purpose guidelines developed subsequent to the analysis results with regard to design basis and beyond design basic accidents. Any available operable equipment shall be used for these actions.

Drills shall be arranged in order to exercise the actions of the ship crew and the special personnel (workers of ship repair and shipbuilding organizations) in case of any accidents on the ship.

 

Radiation safety in the course of operation

 

168. Radiation safety of the ship crew, the special personnel and the public (passengers) in the course of the ship operation shall be ensured due to compliance with the radiation safety assurance legislation of the Russian Federation.

169. The system aimed to monitor integrity of the physical barriers on the way of ionizing radiation and radioactive substance propagation into the environment shall be provided for control of compliance with the specified safe NPU operation limits.

170. The ship design shall provide for the radiological control systems aimed to ensure measurement of the controlled parameters characterizing the radiation situation in the ship rooms in case of design basis and beyond design basis accidents at the NPU as well as in the course of the ship decommissioning.

171. Accounting of the exposure doses for the workers of any other organizations engaged in maintenance of the NPU systems and components shall be arranged on the ship.

172. Reduced air pressure shall be maintained in the RP containment as compared with any other ship rooms in order to prevent any leakages of radioactive gases. Any possibility to use contaminated air for the ship service needs shall be eliminated.

 

VII. Decommissioning of ships and other floating craft
with nuclear reactors

 

173. Decommissioning of the ship shall be planned in the course of the ship design, construction and operation.

174. The ship design shall include the arrangements for safe decommissioning of the ship.

175. Planning of the ship decommissioning in the course of design and construction shall be arranged by development and improvement of the ship decommissioning concept which should be presented in the SAR.

176. Planning of the ship decommissioning in the course of operation shall be arranged by regular review (adjustment) of the ship decommissioning concept presented in the SAR.

In this case the ship operation experience shall be taken into consideration including the experience in performance of repair works, any refurbishment, the results of any inspections of the technical and radiological conditions on the ship and the results of analysis with regard to any past accidents.

177. The operating organization shall ensure development of the decommissioning program including the stage of the NPU preparation for decommissioning not later than five years prior to the ship service life expiry.

178. Comprehensive engineering and radiation examination of the ship shall be performed prior to decommissioning. Comprehensive engineering and radiation examination shall be performed within the scope sufficient for the feasibility study of the ship decommissioning option and adjustment of the decommissioning program.

The operating organization shall ensure adjustment of the design documentation for the ship decommissioning and prepare (update) the SAR with regard to the ship decommissioning activities based on the materials of the comprehensive engineering and radiation ship examination.

179. The NPUs shut down for decommissioning shall be deemed in operation till the SNF removal. All safety requirements for the NPU within this period shall remain the same as for the ship in operation. Reduction of the maintenance scope and the size of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel, decommissioning of individual NPU systems and (or) components shall be carried out in compliance with the changes introduced to the ship operation regulatory documents according to the established procedure, and the competent state authority for safety regulation in atomic energy use shall be duly informed.

180. Unscheduled decommissioning of the ship shall be performed in accordance with the procedure described in par. 178 and 179 of these General Provisions.

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix 1 to
Federal rules and regulations
in the area of atomic energy use "General safety assurance
provisions for ships
and other floating craft with nuclear
reactors" approved by Order of the
Federal Environmental,
Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service
dated September, 4, 2017 No. 351

 

ABBREVIATIONS

 

IHCS

 - Integrated Hardware Control System

SAR

- Safety Analysis Report

SNF

- Spent Nuclear Fuel

ECS

- Emergency Cooldown Station

FPU

- Floating Power Unit

RW

- Radioactive Wastes

RSb

- Radioactive Substances

RP

- Reactor Plant

FE

- Fuel Element

CSS

- Control Safety Systems

NOCS

- Normal Operation Control Systems

CCR

- Central Control Room

-

- Operating Organization

NM

- Nuclear Material

NR

- Nuclear Reactor

NF

- Nuclear Fuel

NPU

- Nuclear Power Unit

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix 2 to
Federal rules and regulations
in the area of atomic energy use "General safety assurance
provisions for ships
and other floating craft with nuclear
reactors" approved by Order of the
Federal Environmental,
Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service
dated September, 4, 2017 No. 351

 

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

 

1. Accident at the nuclear power unit (accident) - an operational occurrence at the NPU with release of radioactive substances and (or) ionizing radiation beyond the boundaries stipulated in the ship design documentation for normal operation in the amounts exceeding the established safe operation limits; an accident is characterized by the initiating event, development scenarios and consequences.

2. Safety of the ship or any other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - the property of the ship or any other floating craft with the NR to ensure reliable protection against any unacceptable radiation exposure for the personnel, the public and the environment in accordance with the federal rules and regulations in the area of atomic energy use.

3. Biological protection of the ship or any other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - any barriers including ship structures intended for protection against ionizing radiation.

4. Large-scale emergency release on the ship or any other floating craft with a nuclear reactor in case of an accident - release of radioactive substances into the environment in case of any accident on the ship or other floating craft with the NR when the measures for protection of the public at the protective action planning zone boundaries and outside it shall be implemented at the initial stage of the accident.

5. Inherent self-protection of the reactor plant - the property to provide safety based on natural responses, processes and characteristics.

6. Decommissioning of the ship or any other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - activities carried out after removal of nuclear fuel and other nuclear materials from the ship or other floating craft with the NR aimed to achieve the prescribed end state of the ship or other floating craft with the NR, preventing its further operation and ensuring safety for the crew members of the ship (other floating craft with the NR), the special personnel, the public and the environment.

7. Main engineering organization - the organization responsible for development of the ship design (or design of any other floating craft with the NR) and ensuring its engineering support at all stages of the complete lifecycle of the ship or other floating craft with the NR.

8. Survivability of the ship or any other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - the property of the systems and components of the ship or any other floating craft with the NR (including the control rooms) to perform the assigned functions in spite of any damages.

9. Containment - the localizing safety system around the reactor plant of the ship or other floating craft with the NR intended to confine any leakages of radioactive substances.

10. Protective enclosure - the localizing safety system surrounding the containment (containments) and intended to confine any leakages of radioactive substances into other ship sections or the environment in case of any containment integrity loss.

11. Initiating event - a single failure in any system and (or) component, internal or external impact, any error of the ship crew and (or) the special personnel, or combination of the above-mentioned events resulting in operational occurrences on the ship or other floating craft with the NR and capable of resulting in deviation from the safe operation limits and (or) conditions.

12. Qualification of the ship crew and the special personnel (qualification) - proficiency level of any person from among the managers and employees of the operating organization affecting the nuclear unit safety including basic vocational education, professional knowledge and skills as well as work experience assuring high quality and safety of the nuclear unit operation in the course of the job duty performance.

13. Reactor coolant circuit - the circuit together with the pressurizing system intended for the coolant circulation through the nuclear core.

14. Collision protection of the ship or any other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - the structural elements of the ship or any other floating craft with the NR intended to protect the ship or any other floating craft with the NR, its reactor plant, safety systems as well as NF and RW storage facilities against any external natural or human-induced impact.

15. "Leak before break" concept - approach to design of pipelines based on the proven crack propagation mechanism when a leak which can be detected through the use of engineering features provided in the nuclear unit design appears before the crack reaches the critical size.

16. Operational occurrence at the nuclear power unit - any disturbance in the NPU operation with deviation from the established operation limits and (or) conditions. In this case other limits and (or) conditions established in the design of the ship or other floating craft with the NR, particularly safe operation limits and (or) conditions can be also exceeded.

17. Normal operation of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - operation of the ship or other floating craft with the NR within the operation limits and conditions determined in the design.

18. Habitability of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - combination of factors characterizing the conditions for stay of the ship crew members and the special personnel of the ship or any other floating craft with the NR in any room and providing the possibility for normal performance of the professional activities by the ship crew members and the special personnel of the ship or any other floating craft with the NR.

19. Construction organization (shipbuilding organization) - the specialized organization performing the ship construction functions.

20. Error of the crew members and (or) the special personnel of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - any single unintended wrong action or single omission of a correct action in control of the NPU systems and components, or any single unintended wrong action or single omission of a correct action in maintenance or repair of the NPU systems and components.

21. Floating power unit - a ship or other floating craft (self-propelled or non-self-propelled floating facility) classified in the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping and intended for power generation through the use of a nuclear reactor (reactors) where the  systems defined in the design documentation for performance of its functions and safe operation are also installed.

22. Cliff edge effect - significant sharp safety deterioration for the NPU (RP) of the ship (floating craft with the NR) caused by slight changes in the parameters.

23. Emergency cooldown station for the nuclear power unit - a dedicated area or room of the ship or other floating craft with the NR containing the equipment and instruments intended for shutdown of the RP and its supporting systems in case of the CCR inoperability.

24. Potentially hazardous work - any work in the course of which an emergency situation or nuclear accident can occur at the NPU of the ship (floating craft with the NR).

25. Reactor plant of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - the part of the ship (floating craft with the NR) NPU including the reactor and its associated systems required for its normal operation, emergency cooling and emergency protection. The RP boundaries shall be defined in the design of the ship or other floating craft with the NR.

26. Special personnel - any persons present on the board of the ship or other floating craft with the NR and not belonging to passengers or the crew.

27. Safe operation conditions of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor  - the minimum requirements for quantity, characteristics, operability, scope, frequency and other conditions of maintenance, control and testing of safety-related systems and components established in the design of the ship or other floating craft with the NR when compliance with the safe operation limits and (or) safety criteria is assured.

28. Crew of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - the persons from the  ship command staff, the operating crew and also any workers servicing the ship passengers within the passenger ship crew.

29. Nuclear power unit of the ship or other floating craft with a nuclear reactor - the complex on the ship or other floating craft with the NR including one or several reactor plants and the associated equipment, systems and components intended for generation of thermal, mechanical and electric energy.

 

 

 

 


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